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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROY JAMES BARNHILL d/b/a
Zions Furniture Upholstering

Plaintiff a:nd Appellant
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9591

vs.

YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY,
a corporation

Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF

OF

RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Roy James Barnhill dba Zions Furniture Upholstering hereinafter referred to as ((Plaintiff" brought this action against Young Electric Sign Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as uDefendant." Plaintiff
claimed that Defendant was negligent in the maintenance
and repair of an electric sign which was located on top of
the building occupied by Plaintiff and as a result, Plaintiff's business and goods were destroyed by a fire on October 30, 1959.
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At the close of the Plaintiff's case the Court granted
a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that there
was no reasonable basis on which a jury could find that
defendant caused the fire or that defendant was negligent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the following statement of facts we will attempt
to present the material facts most favorable to the plaintiff, whether disputed or not, together with the undisputed facts which favor the defendant.
Plaintiff owned and operated a furniture and upholstery business in a building located at 2 0 0 0 South Main,
Bountiful, Utah. ( R. 21 ) The building occupied by the
plaintiff is in the uy" at Parkin Junction, across the highway from the Slim Olson Service Station in Bountiful,
Utah. Defendant had installed and maintained an electric sign on top of the building with a ((Cream O'Weber"
advertisement on the south side of the sign and a ((Hod
Sanders Clover Club Potato Chips" advertisement on the
north side of the sign. (See plaintiff's exhibit P-1) The
building occupied by Plaintiff was completely gutted by
a fire which occurred during the early morning of Octo her 3 0, 19 59. ( R. 3 0)
Lynn Mendenhall, a truck driver for Pacific Intermountain Express, testified that he drove past the building occupied by the plaintiff about 2:15 or 2:25 A.M. on
the morning of October 30, 1959. (R. 45) Mendenhall
stated he did not remember whether the sign was on and
there was nothing in the building that attracted his attention. (R. 46) Mendenhall stated there was a severe wind
on the night of October 30, and that he called his home
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office to advise it was unsafe for unladen vehicles to travel
on the highway because three trucks had been blown over
by the wind. (R. 46)
Elmer Lee, a journeyman lineman for the Utah Power and Light Co. was on a trouble call in Val Verda (a
mile and a half to two miles northeast of Slim Olsen's Service Station) at about 3:30 A.M. on October 30th, 1959,
when he noticed a kind of orange color around Slim Olsen's. (R. 48) When he arrived at the Parkin Junction
he saw the building engulfed in a raging inferno. (R. 49)

Lee testified tha.t the sign was definitely off when he went
to it. (R. 51) He also stated there was a severe wind
blowing debris and smoke and tinder across the highway
toward the west. ( R. 49)
John Meyer, the nightman for Slim Olsen's Service
Station saw the fire between 3:00 and 4:00 A.M. on the
morning of October 30th, 1959. (R. 52) Because of the
terrific wind Meyer had been out watching the signs and
the roof of the warehouse at the Service Station, when he
happened to glance over and saw the flames in the building.
(R. 53) When Meyer first saw the fire it appeared to be
inside the building. (R. 54) Meyer testified that he did
not think the sign was on when he noticed the fire. He

stated the sign turned off around nzidnight or shortly
thereafter. (R. 54)
Ralph Gayhart, a bus driver for Greyhound Bus Co.
drove past the Parkin Junction heading South toward
Salt Lake at approximately 2:45 A.M. on the morning of
October 30, 1959. (R. 64) Gayhart stated as he approached the Junction he saw a udisturbance" on the sign.
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He also saw a fire on top of the building. (R. 64-65) Gayhart testified he could not say whether the fire was underneath the sign or not. (R. 65) Gayhart said there was a
terrific wind on the night of October 29-30th and it was
all he could do to keep the bus on the road. (R. 68)
David Knapton, Raymond Fivas and Helen Hunt,
employees of plaintiff, all testified that they arrived at
work between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M. on the morning of
October 30, 1959 and that the interior of the building had
been ·Completely destroyed by the fire. They all testified
that on October 29, 1959, the day before the fire, defendant's employees had been out working on the sign.
(R. 90, 104, 113) Knapton and Fivas testified there was
something hanging down from the sign when they arrived at the building the morning after the fire. (R. 91,
105) Knapton had no judgment as to when the object
came down. (R. 96) Fivas testified that defendant's employees came out the morning after the fire and cut down
the object hanging from the sign. (R. 106)
Knapton and Fivas said they used tobacco while on
the job. (R. 98, 108) Knapton testified there was a gas
furnace located in the front of the building in the showroom. (R. 98) He also admitted that they had just
stocked up on matting, stuffing and cotton used in the
upholstery business. ( R. 10 0) He stated they had quite
a lot of flammable finishing equipment in the eastern part
of the building. Helen Hunt admitted there was a stove
in the building beside the furnace. ( R. 114) She said the
stove had not been lit for a month but it was fired up in
September or October. (R. 115) Helen Hunt stated she
turned the gas furnace down when she left the building
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on the evening of October 29, 1959. Fivas admitted that
a windstorm had blown out the windows in the building
two or three times before. (R. 108)
James Barnhill, the plaintiff, testified he arrived at the
building at about 8:00 on the morning of October 30,
19 59. ( R. 3 2) Barnhill testified that the i tern he saw hanging down from the sign was about eight or nine inches
across and about six to eight feet long. (R. 130) Barnhill
did not know when the object came down from the sign.
(R. 130)
The Court granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict after the plaintiff rested.
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POINT I
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH
THE JURY COULD FIND THAT THE SIGN
CAUSED THE FIRE.
There is no evidence whatsoever in this record to
show that defendant's sign caused the fire. It is fundamental that plaintiff must produce some competent evidence from which the jury could find that the sign caused
the fire before he is entitled to go to the jury. He failed
to produce any evidence of causation. The uncontroverted
evidence shows that the cause of the fire is unknown.
The building was completely destroyed during a violent
windstorm in the early morning. The damage occurred
before anyone could examine the interior of the building.

Defendant is not required to show the cause of plaintiff's
damage. That burden belongs solely to the plaintiff. The
facts adduced by the plaintiff's witnesses do not reach the
dignity of circumstantial evidence as they produced nothing more than mere possibilities. This court has held that
a jury may not base a verdict on speculation or conjecture.
Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 5 Utah 2d 373,
302 P. 2d 471 (Utah 1956); Jackson v. Colston et al 116
Utah 295, 209 P. 2d 566 (Utah 1949).
The fact that there was high voltage in the sign
proves nothing because the uncontroverted evidence
showed that the sign shut off around midnight. The fire

was not discovered until approximately three hours after
the sign went off which would raise the presumption that
the sign had nothing whatsoever to do with the fire. There
were many instrumentalities which could have caused the
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fire, including the gas furnace, the stove, cigarette butts
left by plaintiff's employees and any number of causes
that would be attributable to the violent wind.
The fact that defendant's employees were working
on the sign the day before the fire proves absolutely nothing. This fact would raise the presumption that the sign
was left in good .condition. The presence of plaintiff's
employees in the building the day before the fire with the
gas furnace on is a fact more probative of the cause than
the presence of defendant's employees. The fact that the
fire was seen on the roof of the building and there was a
disturbance on the sign does not show the cause of the
fire. There was no evidence that the fire started on the

sign. The undisputed evidence proved that the sign shut
off at nzidnight and was off when the fire was discovered.
(R. 51-54) The fact that the fire was seen on the roof
is no indication of the cause of the fire, particularly in
view of the fact that the building had partitions and rooms
which would have blocked outside vision of a fire inside
the building. (R. 131)
The evidence that part of the sign was hanging down
after the fire is not probative of the cause in the absence
of evidence as to when the part fell. If the part fell down

after 1nidnight when the sign was off, it would not have
carried any electricity and obviously could not have started
the fire. The weather report (plaintiff's exhibit P. 7)
shows that the strongest winds occurred during the early
morning of October 30, 1959, after the sign was shut off.
It is most likely that part of the sign fell after the electricity was off and after the :fire had damaged the sign.
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Plaintiff's facts do not constitute any evidence on
which a jury could find that the sign caused the fire. The
wisdom of the rule that a jury should not be allowed to
speculate is demonstrated by the facts of this case. It can
be argued that it is possible that the windows in the building were blown out by the wind, that the gas furnace
turned on, overheated and caused the fire. Or it could be
argued that one of defendant's employees left a cigarette
near some flammable material that was fanned into a fire
by the wind. There is the further possibility that the electric power lines running into the building could have been
broken by the wind, shorted and ·Caused the fire. There
are numerous possibilities that are more probative of the
cause of the fire than defendant's sign.
Plaintiff might just as well have brought suit against
one of his employees or Utah Power and Light Co. as point
a finger of blame at this defendant.
Plaintiff produced no evidence to show that the fire
started in the sign. He completely failed to show that
anything from the sign came in contact with the roof at
any time or if it did, that it was charged with electricity.
Plaintiff's evidence proved that his property was destroyed
by a fire that occurred during the early morning of O·ctober 30, 1959. An examination of the record shows absolutely no evidence of the cause of the fire.
The trial court properly ruled that the plaintiff failed
to make out a case for the jury.
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POINT II
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS NOT APPLICABLE IN
THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS TO
THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE.
Plaintiff cannot use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
as a means of getting the question of causation to the jury.
Until the plaintiff has shown by some competent evidence what caused the fire, we do not reach the question
of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa loquitur
is linzitcd to the question of whether the defendant was
negligent-it has nothing to do with the element of causation.
In the case of Jackson v. Colston supra an action was
brought to recover damages for the alleged burning of
the lower leg of the plaintiff, ·claimed to have been inflicted while she was undergoing reducing treatments
administered under the direction of the defendants. The
trial court granted a motion for a directed verdict on the
ground that there was nothing more than speculation as
to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. On appeal, the
plaintiff claimed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply, which, with the medical testimony, was sufficient to require the court to submit the case to the jury.
This court affirmed the trial court holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be used as a vehicle to
get the case to the jury, in the absence of competent evidence of the cause of the injuries. This court said:
uHowever, a proper understanding of the nature and scope of the doctrine (res ipsa loquitur)
makes it unnecessary to determine whether the rule
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should be applied in the case at bar. In any action for personal injuries arising out of alleged
negligent acts or omissions of the defendant, it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove first, that
the defendant was negligent and, second, that the
defendants' negligent acts or omissions proximately
caused the injury sustained by the plaintiff. In
a proper case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may
relieve the plaintiff of the duty of showing specific
acts of negligence, but the authorities unanimously
hold that the causal connection between the alleged
negligent acts and the injury is never presumed and
that this is a matter the plaintiff is always required
to prove affirmatively. Res ipsa loquitur is limited

to the question of whether the defendant was
negligent-it has nothing to do with the element
of causation. ::· ::· ::· the rule is stated as follows:

* ::- ::· In every personal injury case the plaintiff
must establish two propositions: First, that the defendant was negligent; and second, the causal connection between the negligence and the injury
complained of. Negligence is sometimes presumed,
as in cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies, or where there has been a violation of a
statutory duty, but the proximate cause of an injury is never presumed. On this question there is
no conflict of authority." (Italics ours)
In Farnzers Honze Mutual Insurance Company vs.
Grand Forks l1nplement Conzpany 55 NW 2d 315 (North
Dakota 1952) the Supreme Court of North Dakota held
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not available to
establish proximate cause. In the Farmers case a fire began in defendant's machine shop and spread to and damaged the place of business of the plain tiff's insured. At
the time the fire was discovered, the defendant's emSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ployees were cleaning a generator and a motor by using
gasoline and a brush. There was some evidence that the
fire may have been caused by a short circuit. The plaintiffs claimed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was available to show the actual motivating source of the fire. The
court refused to apply the doctrine stating:
((Plaintiffs are clearly in error in their theory
that the principle of res ipsa loquitur is available to
establish proximate .cause. In proper cases, where
proximate cause is established, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur comes into play to establish prima
facie proof of negligence. The doctrine (has no application to proximate cause and does not dispense
with the requirement that the act or omission on
which defendant's liability is predicated be established as the proximate cause of the injury complained of; ::· ::- ::.' ::- :z. :z. the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur does not raise any presumption as to what
did occasion the injury, but, after the evidence has
established the thing which did occasion the injury,
then, under certain circumstances, this doctrine
zuill raise a presu1nption of negligence." (Italics
ours)
In Kendall vs Fordhanz 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2d 183
(Utah 1932) the Supreme Court of Utah held the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to a case involving damages caused by a fire. Here an action was brought to recover damages for the alleged negligence of the defendant
in causing a fire which burned up a wheat field of about
9 3 acres belonging to the plaintiffs. The defendants drove
their car on plaintiffs wheat field and left it to go talk to
one of the plaintiffs. After an hour or two when the defendants returned to the car they discovered it was burnSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing. In attempting to put out the fire, a burning pad was
thrown on the wheat field thereby causing the fire. The
Court stated there was no evidence in the case to show
what started the fire in defendant's automobile, and therefore the Court was in error in permitting the jury to
speculate as to its origin. The Court said:
((No claim is here made, nor can the claim be
successfully maintained, that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has any application to the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case, nor can it be
said that parking an automobile on or near dry
June grass ad joining a wheat field is an act of
negligence. There is likewise no evidence that the
automobile was smouldering with fire when the defendant and Mr. Carter left it to go over to where
one of the plaintiffs was engaged in repairing his
combine harvester. The court was in error in submitting these alleged acts of negligence to the
. ''
Jury.
Dean Prosser in his work on Torts states that res ipsa
loquitur cannot be invoked to permit the jury to speculate
on causation.
((It is never enough for the plaintiff to prove
merely that he has been injured by the negligence
of someone unidentified. Even though there is
beyond all possible doubt negligence in the air, it
is still necessary to bring it home to the defendant.
On this too the plaintiff has the burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence; and in any case
where it is clear that it is at least equally probable
that the negligence was that of another, the court
must instruct the jury that the plaintiff has not
proved his case. The injury must be traced to a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant was responsible, or it must be shown that
he was responsible for all reasonably probable
causes to 1vhich the accident could be attributed."
(Italics ours) Prosser on Torts 2d. Ed. p. 204
Plaintiff has cited the case of Wightman v. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. supra as authority for the contention that
there is a greater probability that the sign caused the fire
than some other cause. In the Wightman case a gas explosion destroyed the plaintiff's house and killed Mr.
Wightman. It should be noted that in the Wightman
case the cause of the explosion was established. The gas
had definitely caused the explosion-the issue was whether
the explosion occurred in the area for which the gas company was responsible or in the area for which the Wightmans were responsible. The court said there must be a
reasonable basis shown in the evidence from which a jury
could conclude that the explosion occurred in the area for
which the gas company was responsible. In the instant
case there is no evidence as to the cause of the fire. This
court refused to apply res ipsa loquitur and stated:
uThis brings us to the issue, crucial to the
plaintiff's case, whether her evidence was sufficient
upon which to base a finding that the source of the
explosion was in the area for which the gas company was responsible. Such proof cannot rest upon
speculation or conjecture, nor upon a mere choice
of probabilities. To give rise to a jury question
there must be something in the evidence from
which the jury could reasonably believe that there
is a greater probability that the explosion occurred
in that part of the installation than in the pipes or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appliances installed by and under the care of the
Wightmans. Only if there is some such basis in
the evidence would there be any foundation to permit the jury, under res ipsa loquitur, to infer that
some defect or lack of due care in the gas company's part of the installation caused the leak and
the resulting explosion." (Italics ours)
The court further stated:

uN evertheless, a finding of liability of damages must rest on something substantial. We believe that the trial court correctly decided that
there was no reasonable basis shown in the evidence
which would justify a conclusion that there was
any greater likelihood that the explosion occurred
in the gas company's part of the installation than
in the house piping or appliances for which the
Wightmans were responsible. It thus did not err
in refusing to submit the matter to the jury."
Even when the cause of the injury is known this
Court has been reluctant to apply the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. In the case of Matievitch v. Hercules Powder
Company, 3 Utah 2d 283, 282 P. 2d 1045 the plaintiff was
injured by a cap, and stick of dynamite of defendant's
manufacture that exploded as he placed them in a drill
hole. This court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
not applicable when there was no evidence as to how or
why the dynamite exploded, no evidence as to when or
how it was manufactured and none as to how or by whom
it had been handled or treated prior to use. There was
evidence that the plaintiff handled the dynamite in a manner other than as recommended by instructions which accompanied the containers in which they were packaged.
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The court rejected plaintiff's theory of res ipsa loquitur and made the following statement:
((Plaintiff urges that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable under the circumstances recited. We cannot agree. To do so would be to
impose absolute liability and insurability upon
manufacturers of explosives and perhaps most any
other commodity. To do so would be to extend
the fact or fiction of control necessary to invoke
the doctrine to an unreasonable, impractical and
unrealistic degree, where mere injury could dispense with plaintiff's burden of proving a defendant's 11cgligence, even where it would be impossible for defendant to show freedom therefrom."
(Italics ours)
Plaintiff is attempting to use the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur as a crutch to get the matter of causation to a
jury. The courts and text writers have uniformly held
that causation must be based on some competent evidence
and cannot rest on speculation. A gas furnace, a stove,
smoking material, all present in a building heavily stocked
with flammable materials, coupled with a violent windstorm which very likely blew out the windows-these factors linked together demonstrate the speculative elements
surrounding this fire.
Plaintiff's failure to produce any testimony that
would support a verdict that the sign caused the fire precluded the submission of the case to the jury.
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CONCLUSION
The building occupied by the plaintiff was destroyed
by a fire which occurred in the early morning during a
violent windstorm. There is no evidence as to the cause of
the fire. There was· no evidence whatsoever that defendant's sign caused the fire. As this court stated in the Wightman case supra.

uN evertheless a finding of liability for damages must rest on something substantial.

*
Such proof cannot rest upon speculation or
conjecture nor upon a mere choice of probabilities."
The undisputed facts in this case show that there is
no reasonable basis on which a jury could find that defendant caused the :fire or that defendant was negligent.
The order granting the motion for a directed verdict
was proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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